PROTECTION OF INVESTORS’ RIGHTS WITHIN
THE PROCEDURE OF INSOLVENCY (BANKRUPTCY)
OF NON-CREDIT FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE LEGAL RESEARCH
Master’s Degree in Law at the MGIMO University,
LL.M. in Commercial Law at the Manchester University,
PhD Researcher at the University of Turin
Ph.D. Student of the Department of Civil Law of the Law Faculty
of the Lomonosov Moscow State University
This review is an analysis of possible ways to reform the existing domestic legislation on
insolvency (bankruptcy) of financial organizations, based on the experience of leading
foreign jurisdictions, which following the economic crisis of 2008–2010 has already
implemented some models of regulation of financial rehabilitation and liquidation in
the framework of insolvency (bankruptcy) of financial institutions.
Keywords: insolvency; bankruptcy; NFO; non-credit financial organizations; investment
funds; securitization; financial recovery; investor protection.
Coffee J.C., Jr. Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight // Columbia Law Review. 2011. Vol. 111.
Douglas J.L., Guynn R.D. Restructuring and Liquidation of US Financial Institutions
// Global Financial Crisis: Navigating and Understanding the Legal and Regulatory
Aspects / Ed. by E.A. Bruno, N. y Cano. Globe Law and Business, 2009.
Gandhi P., Lustig H. Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns: A Fiscal Explanation
// National Bureau of Economic Research. 2010. Working Paper No. 16553.
Hensarling J. After Five Years, Dodd-Frank Is a Failure // https://www.wsj.com/
Lebel C. Innovations apportées aux plans de sauvegarde et de redressement par la loi
de la regulation bancaire et financière du 22 octobre 2010 // Gaz. Pal. 2011. No. 8.
Manie V. Le sort des créanciers dans les plans de sauvegarde, de redressement et
de cession de l’entreprise. Université Toulouse I, Sciences sociales, 2006.
Martin-Serf A. Tout en restant chef dans son entreprise // LPA. 2007. No. 119.
Schillig M. Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions. Oxford
University Press, 2016.
Schwarcz S.L. Too Big To Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility
// Minnesota Law Review. 2017. Vol. 102.
Statement from Senator Warren on Rejection of Banks’ “Living Wills” by Fed and
FDIC // http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1112.
Tracy R. The Dodd-Frank Rule Banks Want to Keep // http://www.wsj.com/
Wallison P.J. Dodd-Frank and Too Big to Fail Receive Too Little Attention //
Information about the author
Chichakyan R.A. (Moscow) – Master’s Degree in Law at the MGIMO University,
LL .M. in Commercial Law at the Manchester University, PhD Researcher at the
University of Turin (Campus Luigi Einaudi, Lungo Dora Siena, 100 A, 10153, Torino
TO, Italy; e-mail: Rimmach94@gmail.com).
Zikun I.I. (Moscow) – Ph.D. Student of the Department of Civil Law of the
Law Faculty of the Lomonosov Moscow State University (119991, GSP-1, Moscow,
Leninskie Gory 1, bldg. 13-14; e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org).