СПОСОБЫ РЕШЕНИЯ ПРОБЛЕМЫ РАСЩЕПЛЕНИЯ СОБСТВЕННОСТИ И РИСКА
В ЕВРОПЕЙСКОМ И АНГЛОСАКСОНСКОМ ПРАВЕ*

https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2022-22-4-47-82

В статье анализируются способы решения проблем, порождаемых расщеплением риска и владения имущественными правами участия в корпорации. В результате анализа теоретической модели определенных стратегий расщепления (в частности, использования деривативов, свопов, манипулирования датой закрытия реестра и заключения договоров на разницу), а также применения к ним методологии экономического анализа права предлагаются варианты решения исправления негативных эффектов использования вышеуказанного инструментария расщепления риска и собственности.

Ключевые слова: корпоративное право; расщепление собственности и риска; негативное расщепление собственности и риска; позитивное расщепление собственности и риска; деривативы; свопы; договоры на разницу; манипулирование датой закрытия реестра; экономический анализ права; транзакционные издержки.

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Information about the author

Chernyy V.V. (Moscow) – ll.M. (NYU), M. iur. priv., PhD Student, Department of Civil law, law Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University (1 Leninskie Gory, Bldg. 13 (4th education building), GSP-1, Moscow, 119991, Russia; e-mail: vsevolod.chernyy@gmail.com).

SOLUTIONS TO RISK DECOUPLING STRATEGIES IN EUROPEAN AND ANGlO-SAXON LAW

https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2022-22-4-47-82

The article examines solutions to the risk-decoupling phenomenon. As a result of the analysis of certain decoupling strategies’ theoretical model (in particular, referring to derivatives, swaps, record date capture, and contracts for difference) as well as the application of the Law&Economics methodology to them, solutions for correcting neg- ative effects arising from the use of the above mentioned mechanisms of risk-decoupling are proposed.

Keywords: corporate law; risk decoupling; negative risk decoupling; positive risk decoupling; derivatives; swaps; contracts for difference; record date capture; economic analysis of law; transactional costs.