СТРАТЕГИИ РАСЩЕПЛЕНИЯ СОБСТВЕННОСТИ
И РИСКА В КОРПОРАТИВНОМ ПРАВЕ:
ТЕОРЕТИЧЕСКАЯ МОДЕЛЬ И ПРАКТИЧЕСКИЕ ИМПЛИКАЦИИ
(часть первая)

В.В. ЧЁРНЫЙ,
LL.M. (NYU), магистр частного права, аспирант кафедры гражданского права юридического факультета
МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова

https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2021-21-3-117-172

В статье анализируется феномен расщепления риска и владения имущественными правами участия в корпорации. Рассматриваются ключевые стратегии достижения соответствующего расщепления, которые позволяют сделать объем риска акционера либо участника корпорации меньше объема его прав участия в корпорации, а также такие, при которых риск акционера или участника корпорации становится выше, чем принадлежащий ему объем прав участия.
Данные эффекты достигаются путем использования таких средств, как деривативы, свопы, манипулирование датой закрытия реестра, а также договоры на разницу. В результате анализа теоретической модели названных стратегий и применения к ним методологии экономического анализа права предлагаются решения по исправлению негативных эффектов от использования вышеуказанного инструментария расщепления риска и владения имущественными правами в корпоративном праве.


Ключевые слова: корпоративное право; расщепление собственности и риска; негативное расщепление собственности и риска; пустое голосование; скрытая собственность; остаточный интерес; деривативы; свопы; манипулирование датой закрытия реестра; экономический анализ права; транзакционные издержки; принципал-агентская проблема.

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Information about the author

Chernyy V.V. (Moscow) – LL.M. (NYU), M. iur. priv., PhD Student, Department of Civil Law, Law Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University (1 Leninskie Gory, Bldg. 13 (4th education building), GSP-1, Moscow, 119991, Russia; e-mail: vsevolod.chernyy@gmail.com).

RISK DECOUPLING STRATEGIES IN CORPORATE LAW:
THEORETICAL MODEL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
(first part)

V.V. CHERNYY,
LL.M. (NYU), M. iur. priv., PhD Student, Department of Civil Law, Law Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University

https://doi.org/10.24031/1992-2043-2021-21-3-117-172

The principal focus of the paper is the risk-decoupling phenomenon in corporate law. Key strategies for achieving decoupling are considered, such as those, in which the amount of risk of a shareholder is less than the amount of her participatory rights in
the corporation, as well as those, in which the risk of a shareholder is higher than the rights of participation belonging to her. This effect is achieved through the use of derivatives, swaps, the record date capture as well as through contracts for difference. As a result of the analysis of the theoretical model of these strategies and the application of the Law & Economics methodology solutions for correcting negative effects arising from the use of the above mentioned mechanisms of risk-decoupling are proposed.


Keywords: corporate law; risk decoupling; negative risk decoupling; empty voting; hidden ownership; residual interest; derivatives; swaps; record date capture; economic analysis of law; transactional costs; principal-agent problem.

References

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Mechanism] // THESIS. 1994. Iss. 5.
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of Law] (in Russian). Moscow: Statut, 2016.
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Economic Analysis of Corporate Law] (in Russian) // Bulletin of Economic Justice
of the Russian Federation. 2016. No. 9.
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Evidence from the Securities Lending Market // Journal of Finance. 2015. Vol. 70.
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Governance // Law and Financial Markets Review. 2014. Vol. 8.
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Review. 2008. Vol. 60.
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Economic Perspectives. 2003. Vol. 17.
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and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders //
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2001. Vol. 36.
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droit privé. 2012.
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Better Safe than Sorry // Journal of Corporate Law Studies. 2015. Vol. 15.
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Journal of Finance. 1970. Vol. 25.
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Frankel T. The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership from Control //
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Oxford, 2015.
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Review. 1984. Vol. 70.
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the Comparative Taxonomy // Harvard Law Review. 2006. Vol. 119.
Gilson R.J., Black B.S. The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions. 2nd ed.
Westbury, N.Y., 1995.
Gilson R.J., Kraakman R.H. Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still
a Matter of Information Costs // Virginia Law Review. 2014. Vol. 100.
Grundmann S. European Company Law: Organization, Finance and Capital Markets.
2nd ed. Antwerp, 2012.
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1996.
Hansmann H., Kraakman R.H. Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights // https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=6068&context=fss_papers.
Hasen R. Vote Buying // California Law Review. 2000. Vol. 88.
Hayek F.A. The Use of Knowledge in Society // American Economic Review.
1945. Vol. 35.
Hu H.T.C., Black B.S. The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership // Southern California Law Review. 2006. Vol. 79.
Hu H.T.C., Black B.S. Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy,
Implications, and Reforms // Business Lawyer. 2006. Vol. 61.
Hu H.T.C., Black B.S. Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and
Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership // Journal
of Corporate Finance. 2007. Vol. 13.
Hu H.T.C. Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of
Decoupling and Transparency // Business Lawyer. 2015. Vol. 70. P. 347–406.
Hu H.T.C. Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the Law and Finance
of the Corporate Objective // Texas Law Review. 1995. Vol. 73.
Hu H.T.C. Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, Pure Information, and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm // Texas Law Review. 2012. Vol. 90.
Hu H.T.C., Black B.S. Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance
and Extensions. // University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 2008. Vol. 156.
Hudson A. The Law of Finance. 2nd ed. London, 2013.
Iffland J., Gilliard N. Les nouvelles règles en matière de publicité des participations
importantes // Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht. 2007. Bd. 4.
Jensen C.M., Meckling W.H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure //Journal of Financial Economics. 1976. Vol. 3.
Kahan M., Rock E. The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting // Georgetown Law
Journal. 2008. Vol. 96.
Kalay A., Karakaş O., Pant S. The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and
Evidence from Option Prices // Journal of Finance. 2014. Vol. 69.
Karmel R.S. Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy
Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights? // Villanova Law
Review. 2010. Vol. 55.
Arrow K.J. The Limits of Organization. New York, 1974.
Kobayashi B., Ribstein L. Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device // UC Davis
Law Review. 2006. Vol. 40.
Leuz C. Was the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion of
Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions // Journal of Accounting
and Economics. 2007. Vol. 44.
Macey J.R., Netter J.M. Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process // Washington
University Law Quarterly. 1987. Vol. 65.
Manne H.G. Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting. An Essay in Honor of
Adolf A. Berle // Columbia Law Review. 1964. Vol. 64.
Martin D. L’intérêt des actionnaires se confond-il avec l’intérêt social? // Mélanges
en l’honneur de Dominique Schmidt – Liber Amicorum. Paris, 2005.
Mason A., Flandin G., Bauquis S. Des récentes affaires impliquant l’usage des
dérivés actions // Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier. 2011. N° 3.
McCahery J. A. Vermeulen E.P.M. Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies.
Oxford University Press, 2008.
McCarthy C. Exigences de Transparence et Hedge Funds // Revue de la stabilité
financière. 2007. Vol. 10.
Olson M., Jr. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, 1965.
Miller J., DiRisio M. The Potential Implications of Decoupling Shareholders’ Economic
and Voting Interests in Corporate Control Contests // International Corporate
Governance Review. 2008. Vol. 4.
Moloney N. EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation. 3rd ed. Oxford,
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Information about the author

Chernyy V.V. (Moscow) – LL.M. (NYU), M. iur. priv., PhD Student, Department of Civil Law, Law Faculty, Lomonosov Moscow State University (1 Leninskie Gory, Bldg. 13 (4th education building), GSP-1, Moscow, 119991, Russia; e-mail: vsevolod.chernyy@gmail.com).